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ABSTRACT: This paper examines how the Brazilian food industry has
been heavily affected by several recent institutional and economic changes.
The food industry, including the processing and retail sectors, is part of
a broader agribusiness system that conditions corporations’ strategies,
performance, and adoption of adequate governance structures. The
Brazilian agroindustrialization process that preceded the formation of
the sub-regional free-trade area (Mercosur) and economic liberalization
inﬂuenced subsequent development of the agribusiness and food system
in the Mercosur countries and their investment and trade links to
countries outside Mercosur. The article emphasizes business strategies
for coping with challenges and opportunities that have arisen from
Mercosur integration, from economic stabilization programs and, more
importantly, from a broad range of institutional changes such as trade
liberalization, deregulation, and the friendlier treatment of foreign
capital. These changes have together fostered the globalization process
in the region and have stimulated different responses from large and
small ﬁrms, all threatened by the new, competitive environment.
INTRODUCTION
Mercosur (The Southern Common Market) was implemented on January 1, 1995,
established by the Asuncion Treaty signed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay in March 1991. Regional integration in the Mercosur block and general
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ISSN: 1096-7508 All rights of reproduction in any form reservedeconomic reform in the member countries have quickly changed the competitive
environment in Mercosur. Mercosur has faced many challenges to fully imple-
ment the common market. Regional integration has occurred gradually, as the
Treaty established a timetable for tariff reductions and the harmonization of
macroeconomic and sectoral policies as well as legislation; full results have not
yet been reached. Increased intraregional trade ﬂows and regional business
strategies show integration has progressed.
The region’s economy is also more integrated with the world economy because
of globalization, and changes in the global food economy are mirrored in
Mercosur’s. Two factors drive globalization. The ﬁrst are technological advances
in transporting, preserving, and storing products as well as managing and
exchanging information. The second is policy and institutional change—trade
liberalization, ﬁnancial market deregulation, growing acceptance of foreign direct
investment and foreign ﬁrms, the growing protection of intellectual property, and
the rise of competition and consumer protection laws.
The sudden exposure to liberalized markets and the accompanying deep
institutional change constituted a powerful shock to the food and agricultural
sectors in Mercosur countries, as those sectors had been subsidized, controlled,
and protected as part of governments’ import substitution strategy before the
1990s.
This article focuses on how the food industry in Mercosur responded to the
market and institutional shock of globalization. The ﬁrst section discusses the
context of the development of Mercosur, and how globalization affected it. The
rest of the paper then focuses on Brazil as a case study of the largest country in
Mercosur, with majority or near-majority shares of Mercosur’s GDP, population,
and trade.
1 The second section describes structural changes in Brazil’s food and
agricultural sectors with the advent of globalization and liberalization in the 1990s
(contrasting them with the prior situation). The third section focuses on business
strategies in the Brazilian food industry in the face of these changes. The fourth
section concludes by examining major risks and opportunities for new invest-
ments in Mercosur, and managerial implications.
THE CONTEXT:M ERCOSUR AGRIFOOD TRADE DEVELOPMENT
Growth in Trade
The growth of intra-Mercosur trade ﬂows has been rapid. Until 1990, the average
share per country of exports to other Mercosur countries in total exports was 10%;
by 1994, the average was 20%, and by 1998, 25% (Table 1). In volume, intrablock
trade ﬂows trebled in seven years. Overall exports from Mercosur countries grew
140% from 1990 to 1998, or 13% a year (Table 1)—that is, in the period after
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Institutional and Economic Changes in Brazil 317trade liberalization. Thus, despite growth of trade within the block, trade with
partners outside the block is still much more important—only 17% of Brazil’s and
34% of Argentina’s exports go to Mercosur. These ﬁgures suggest that rather than
diverting trade, Mercosur’s “open regionalism” has created trade.
But it can be hypothesized that the net effect on trade diversion or creation is
theoretically ambiguous. The shifts of the members toward their comparative
advantages after reform and integration has partially diverted trade from interna-
tional markets towards the block, offset by the pursuit of economies of scale and
scope by businesses in member countries to be competitive for increased trade on
world markets (Chichilnisky, 1992). The net effect has not yet been examined
empirically in Mercosur. Yet to date, the dominant perspective among the
members is of a zero-sum game that leads to frequent conﬂicts and retrogressions
that have marked the evolution of Mercosur. Reform and integration has not been
a one-way street. Regional specialization provoked painful adjustments in
members’ economies—which occasionally provoked protectionist reactions.
Those steps backward are dangerous because they threaten further intrablock
integration and discourage agrifood businesses from “going regional.”
Trade growth has combined with a second factor to cause deep restructuring of
the members’ agrifood economies: the countries have also undergone stabilization
programs to curb long-term inﬂationary pressures and to correct overvaluation of
currencies (Zylberstajn and Jank, 1996). The reforms and subsequent develop-
ment processes of Brazil and Argentina have strongly affected the overall
character of Mercosur, given their preponderant weight, and given that both had
very closed economies before reform. Both followed strategies of import
substitution before the reforms, including high levels of market protection,
pervasive state participation in and control of the agrifood sector, and interest
groups well organized to defend those policies. These policies resulted in a
complex and very integrated agro-industrial system that was challenged by drastic
trade liberalization, ﬁrst in Argentina (as in the disintegration of milk clusters in
Brazil, see Dirven, this volume) and more recently in Brazil, as discussed in the
next section.
Constraints to Integration
The most important challenges to Mercosur consolidation are as follows. First,
the tax structure of the country-members is far from being consistent, resulting in
biased competitive advantage. The heavy tax burden on the Brazilian agribusiness
systems, including some windfall taxes, has hurt competitive advantage, not only
in Mercosur but also in global markets. However, Argentina has increased taxes
to meet public deﬁcits, as was done in Brazil.
Second, exchange rate policies have a direct impact on trade patterns and
continue to disequilibrate intraregional trade and create difﬁculties for the
318 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001implementation of common external tariffs. The recent devaluation of the
Brazilian currency (the real) and the Mercosur crisis that followed is testimony to
this unstable equilibrium.
Third, common external tariffs can determine the global trade volume and
investments in Mercosur. The most important difﬁculty is related to the current
average tariff level among country-members. This average tariff results mainly
from the industrial policy of each country. Currently, Brazil’s average tariff is
14%, while Argentina’s is 10% and Paraguay’s is zero, which explains why
Paraguay has been an important door for Brazilian coffee and soybean and
Argentine cigarette contraband.
Fourth, infrastructure integration is still very poor in Mercosur, because of a
historically low level of trade among the country-members. Harbor duties and
other harbor costs are much higher than the international standards as a
consequence of regulatory practices and government monopolies. Only seven
years ago, in Mercosur countries, all infrastructure services were provided by state
companies. The privatization of public utilities is now changing the landscape and
opening a vast opportunity for investments.
Fifth, so far, the member countries have not built a common regulatory
apparatus, such as antitrust policies, consumer protection laws, standards of health
and hygiene requirements for food products, and packing and trade regulations.
Brazil has the longest experience of antitrust policy enforcement and is the only
member with a merger and acquisition law. Also, the Brazilian Consumer Law is
the tightest and Brazilian corporations have been adjusting to its requirements.
Very recently, there has been movement, albeit small, towards the harmonization
of regulations concerning competition and consumer rights. Also, the hygiene and
sanitation requirements are still rather unbalanced. Grades and standards on
packaging and additives are different and provide a source of protectionism.
National certiﬁcation is not accepted within the common market. Once again,
Brazilian rules are the most severe, though the government’s reputation for
monitoring and guaranteeing standards is very poor. This is not the case of
Uruguay’s system of quality standards, which is internationally renowned.
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Branda ˜o and Carvalho (1980) and Dias and Amaral (1999) note that in the 1970s,
the Brazilian economy was highly protected as part of the import-substitution
model of development. Brazilian agriculture grew quickly, supported by mini-
mum prices and government procurement, and spurred by a rapid increase in the
use of agricultural machinery and by subsidized credit. Agriculture received net
transfers that amounted to 8% of the agricultural GDP. Subsidized rural credit and
Institutional and Economic Changes in Brazil 319declining relative prices (agricultural relative to industrial) beneﬁted both the
mechanical and chemical input industry and the food industry. The agricultural
sector became an important market for industrial goods and, at the same time,
provided cheap raw materials for downstream food and ﬁber industries. Those
downstream industries were highly protected with high tariffs.
Policy created two groups of agricultural products: internal market products
and export products. While the prices of the former were determined by domestic
supply and demand, the prices of the latter were determined in world markets.
Sectoral regulations and barriers to trade created and preserved that distinction.
Through the 1980s, agricultural policy protected “domestic market products” at
the expense of export products, to guarantee an adequate real wage for the
industrial sector.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the rural credit system was not merely ﬁnancial—it
provided a coordination system that oriented food supply policy—including
minimum prices, government procurement, and storage—to achieve the objective
of low-priced food and constrain inﬂation. As inﬂation increased, interest rates
became negative, thus increasing subsidies.
The government’s capacity to ﬁnance transfers and subsidies to agriculture
declined with the second petroleum shock in 1979 and the Brazilian external debt
crisis in 1982. Inﬂation grew from 40% in 1980 to 200% in 1984 and a negotiation
with the World Bank and the IMF became unavoidable. The traditional recom-
mendations of tight monetary policy and public deﬁcit reduction at the macro-
economic level were accompanied by World Bank credit support to several
sectors, conditional on deregulation, including price liberalization.
Economic policy reform was concentrated in 1987 through 1992. For more
than 20 years the Brazilian government had been pervasively involved in the
economy in production, infrastructure, public services, and regulation. Since
1988, trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization threatened Brazilian
companies’ established positions, requiring new strategies to foster competitive-
ness. Credit subsidies were cut, minimum prices and government procurement of
food products were eliminated, tariffs were reduced, trade direct (quantity)
controls and export and import licenses were eliminated, customs procedures were
modernized. The remaining restrictions apply to health, food safety, and animal
and agricultural diseases. Among agrifood items, the tariff reduction schedule set
the lowest level of protection (0–10%) on chemical inputs. The greatest protection
was kept for tractors and equipment (30%). Dairy and sugar received higher tariffs
(20%), while cotton had no tariff other than an export prohibition to favor the
textile industry. Consequently, Brazil became a net cotton importer after having
exported for many years.
Surprisingly, during the transition to a freer economy, agricultural production
has kept on growing (Figure 1), with increasing productivity, without the
320 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001adjustment crises seen elsewhere such as in Argentina. The reason for the
continued growth of agricultural production can be found in agroindustrial
growth. The inputs industry as well as agrifood commerce and the food and ﬁber
processing industry began to ﬁnance the agricultural sector, assuming the role of
system coordinator, a role previously performed by the State. Contrary to
expectations, the private ﬁnancial sector did not take on this role, causing the
productive sectors to enter activities in which they had no expertise, generating
one of the main threats to the new model: breach of contract. Only recently have
new commercial instruments begun to emerge, mediated by the ﬁnancial system.
At the same time, the terms of trade improved for farm products, due, among
other factors, to trade liberalization, beginning in the farm input market. From
1987 to 1998, the increase in the purchasing power of agriculture and husbandry
grew around 59%, combining improved terms of trade (31% on average) with
productivity gains (22% on average).
Following economic reform, food sector trade deﬁcits increased for several
reasons. (1) Farm input imports increased as did imports of consumer goods
spurred by higher incomes. (2) Exports did not grow as quickly as expected—and
even stagnated. The ratio of exports/production, after 20 years of steady growth,
reached a plateau of around 20 to 25% during the second half of the 1980s, and
has declined slightly following the policy reforms—despite the modernization
effort (Figure 2). (3) Productivity and prices of products for the domestic market
have grown more quickly than those for exports. While land productivity grew
quickly between 1987 and 1998 (1.85% per year for crops and 1.94% for
livestock), the growth was fastest in staples (rice, corn, beans), and in livestock.
While domestic product prices were pulled up by fast-growing consumer demand,
export and import-substitution sectors were exposed to trade liberalization and
thus downward pressure on prices. (4) Most Brazilian food companies are only
Figure 1. Agriculture and Livestock Production Index 1962–1998
(1996 5 100)
Institutional and Economic Changes in Brazil 321residual exporters, even in the case of leading ﬁrms. The latter even tended to shift
toward attention to the growing domestic market after the 1994 macroeconomic
stabilization program (Farina and Azevedo, 1999). Agricultural exports also
suffered with the systematic exchange rate overvaluation, which also hurt
processed food exports, mainly after the Stabilization Plan.
The trade deﬁcit persisted even after the Brazilian exchange rate devaluation in
1999. This caused concern, which led to the creation of competitiveness fora,
based on the concept of supply chains and headed by the Development and Trade
Minister. Together with APEX (the Export Promotion Agency) the fora are
expected to improve export performance—with the opening of international
ofﬁces, promotion of the Made in Brazil label, the pursuit of global market
opportunities and consistent export strategies, and the addressing of distributive
conﬂicts within chains.
Figure 2. Export Coefﬁcient Evolution 1962–1996 (%)
Figure 3. Evolution of Marketing Margins–Farm Gate
Index/Food Retail Price Index 1980–1995
322 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001Food industry proﬁt margins have been squeezed by liberalization and
monetary stabilization policies, with margins lower in 1990–1998 than in the
second half of the 1980s. The prices of processed foods fell 30% between 1994
and 1997, driven by the intensiﬁcation of competition among local food
companies, by the growing market power of retailers (especially supermarket
chains) and by processed food imports.
A crucial point is that domestic food demand has grown quickly over the past
decade, driven by rising incomes. Figure 4 shows a systematic ascending ratio of
urban wages to food prices. The stabilization program caused a modest improve-
ment in income distribution (the Gini coefﬁcient went from 0.601 in 1993 to 0.565
in 1995). Those who beneﬁted most were the poorest 20% whose monthly income
almost doubled. At the same time, the food real price declined, favoring the lower
income classes.
Figure 4. Urban Wages/Food Prices 1980–1997
Figure 5. Brazilian Food Real Price Index
Institutional and Economic Changes in Brazil 323The immediate effect was twofold: (1) a general increase in food demand, and
(2) a recomposition of demand towards protein and value-added products,
especially dairy and meat, which have elastic demand. For an average 30%
increase in real incomes, frozen food, yogurt, dairy desserts, and petit suisse
cheese demand grew more than 80%; processed meat, juices, and vegetables
grew more than 30%. (However, the value of gross sales of processed food
increased only 18%, because of a decrease in food prices.) As a consumer
trend in Brazil and in Mercosur in general, there is also a small but
fast-growing demand for services-added food, associated with greater quality,
nutrition, health, and environmental sustainability. The increase in demand for
processed as well as prepared food is partly driven by an increase in the
opportunity cost of women’s time, as they enter the away-from-home
workforce. In 1971, 23% of Brazilian workforce were women, while by
1997–1998 that ﬁgure had climbed to 40%. In 1971, the average time of meal
preparation was 2 hr, decreasing to 15 min in 1997–1998.
Since 1996, the Brazilian economy grew more slowly than expected. Even
so, the average growth rate of food consumption in 1993–1997 was extremely
high, especially when compared to developed countries (Table 2). Despite this
improvement in Brazilian food consumption, the Argentine and Uruguayan
per capita consumption is still much higher, especially for protein foods.







Dry pasta 24.82 5.5
Ham 111.59 20.5
Hamburger 154.95 26.3
Fruit juice concentrate 113.30 20.8
Biscuit 80.46 15.8
Tomato paste 48.24 10.2
Tomato sauce 87.20 16.9
Margarine 24.92 5.7







Petit suisse cheese 167.93 27.9
Flavored milk 260.47 37.7
UHT ﬂuid milk* 134.59 23.7
Condensed milk 66.98 13.7
Powder milk 35.95 7.8
Baby formula milk* 102.06 19.2
Source: Nielsen. *1995 ﬁrst column ** source Anualpec-FNP (1998).
324 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001While protein intake is 99.3 gr. per capita in Argentina, Brazil’s is 65.9.
Consequently, Brazil still has great potential for increasing and diversifying
food demand, compared to EEC countries and the U.S.
The Brazilian food market is huge and has the potential to grow further,
quickly, as discussed below. Part of this increase has been met by imports;
whereas only 10% of Brazilian exports to Mercosur are in food products, 31%
of Brazilian imports from Mercosur are food products. Indeed, growth
potential of the Mercosur food market is concentrated in Brazil. The Brazilian
per capita GDP is lower than that of Argentina and Uruguay and the income
distribution is the worst in the sub-region. This implies potential for a growing
food demand, as is corroborated by the food demand increase in the 1990s,
shown in Table 2.
The food industry and food retailing strategies are geared to and reﬂect the
investment opportunities arising from the market development discussed
above. Most Argentine and Uruguayan investments were stimulated by access
to the Brazilian food market, not only in the dairy sector but also processed
food.
FOOD INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING AND AGRIBUSINESS STRATEGIES
Investment Strategies
There has been substantial foreign direct investment in Mercosur food industries.
There has been substantial investment from outside Mercosur in Mercosur. The
growth potential of the food market has attracted new investments from
multinational companies. Acquisitions have been the most common strategy to
grow and enter new markets.
Moreover, despite Mercosur’s stop-and-go integration process, more than
U.S.$ 3 billion over 1994 through 1998 were invested by 458 Brazilian companies
in Argentina and by 322 Argentine companies in Brazil. Food, chemical, and
automotive industries are among the most integrated. Brazil has become the main
market for exports of key branches of the Argentine food industry, such as dairy
and wheat products. The growth of Argentine exports to Brazil has stimulated
investment, organizational change, joint ventures, and strategic partnerships to
improve the information and knowledge of the Brazilian food market structure.
An analogous process has occurred for Brazilian companies with respect to the
Argentine market.
Strategic alliances and joint ventures have changed the competitive environ-
ment in Mercosur. Argentine companies have invested heavily in Brazil, acquir-
ing Brazilian ﬁrms or building their own plants and distribution systems. Many
Brazilian companies are investing and looking for partnerships in Argentina and
Uruguay, resulting in real business integration. Also, the fast-food companies’
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produced in Brazil for McDonald’s and a recent frozen potato plant in Argentina
will supply all the McDonald’s restaurants in Mercosur.
Investments in new capacity have also increased, with most of those in the
Mercosur oriented to the Brazilian market. The acquisitions and mergers have
been followed by the adoption of modernization and quality assurance processes
in the acquired ﬁrms, improving competitiveness and expanding capacity.
The immediate consequence of these new investments and entries in the food
market has been an increase in competitive pressure, resulting in lower prices
(Figure 5), a larger number of products, increasing market segmentation, and
differentiation. This also had the effect of increasing the concentration ratio and
the degree of “internationalization” (foreign ownership) (see Jank et al., this
volume).
The capital movements in Mercosur are as important as the trade ﬂows in
understanding the integration progress. Capital movements are less sensitive
to short-term movements of exchange and interest rates and more responsive
to long-term institutional changes. The Asuncion Treaty and subsequent
agreements are important to the establishment of the new rules of the game,
though they are still incomplete and far from representing agreement on
important aspects.
The ﬂaws in the institutional framework have stimulated protectionist strategies
inside the block, creating nontariff barriers to trade ﬂows. For example, there has
been a “potato war” between Brazil and Argentina, based on Brazilian legislation
that regulates the use of agrochemicals. Brazilian producers have succeeded in
creating a health barrier to Argentine exports, thus protecting national suppliers.
Also, beer circulation has been restricted by Brazilian legislation, which regulates
the additives in food and beverages. The protectionist behavior will only fade as
the institutional rules consolidate and the nontariff barriers can no longer be used
as an anticompetitive device.
Concentration in Retail: The Rise in the Power of Supermarket and Fast-
food Chains
Food prices (relative to nonfood prices) have declined almost 40% from 1994
to 1997 in Brazil and have not increased since then, despite the 1999 Brazilian
exchange rate devaluation. These price decreases have been driven by economic
stagnation and retailers’ market power, which prevented increases in the prices of
imported inputs from being transmitted to consumers.
Brazilian food retailing has become more concentrated than the processing
segment. As in the food industry, mergers and acquisitions were the main path for
concentration and denationalization. By 1999, of the 10 largest supermarkets, four
were multinationals and one had formed a partnership with an international
326 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001company; in 1994, there was only one multinational ﬁrm among the top 10.
Moreover, the role of supermarkets in food distribution has increased and now
covers 72% of food consumption expenditures in Brazil. The consequence of
those changes is that supermarkets have attained higher market power to negotiate
prices with food processors and wholesalers, and to impose their own standards.
But international retailers have also spurred the modernization of Brazilian
retailers. Heavier competition has reduced supermarkets’ operational margins and
fostered new patterns of competition.
The fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV) department has become a factor of
differentiation and proﬁt recovery for supermarkets. However, its management is
particularly complex because of the absence of standards and uncertainty in
supply. The larger supermarkets have made formal or informal agreements with
wholesalers, which sometimes include supply management and waste control.
Waste has been enormous in FFV market channels and for that reason waste
control can provide an important source of gain. Wholesaler ﬁrms are responsible
for both the produce within the stores and supply chain management. Agreements
with wholesalers enable the supermarket to reduce risk and increase product
quality and the wholesaler to add service and margin to his traditional business.
Frequently, market risk is transferred entirely to the wholesaler, who is paid only
for the quantity actually sold, and the price negotiation is strongly based on the
spot market. Consequently, most wholesalers prefer to supply small and medium
supermarkets and open-air merchants, opening an opportunity for those ﬁrms to
survive, despite the market power of leading retailers.
Market Segmentation Strategies
Market segmentation strategies have been based on the quality dimension, and
new consumer trends associated with health, nutrition, and convenience. Pre-
prepared and frozen food sales have grown 20% annually, while sales of diet and
light products have grown 26% per year since 1990. The share of vacuum-packed
milk in total consumption of ﬂuid milk increased from 4% to almost 70% over the
1990s.
To put in place a segmentation strategy based on quality and cost control, the
food industry and food services have changed upstream relationships. Formal or
informal contracts have been adopted between the food industry and suppliers.
Those contracts establish different prices according to scale, quality requirements,
and crop, harvest, and postharvest practices. The process has already been
important in poultry and pork breeding and is now extending to the milk, orange,
coffee, and horticulture subsectors. Food service companies, mainly in fast food,
have stimulated important changes in production and management practices in
both the processing and the raw material segments, to meet standards (Farina and
Machado, 1999).
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Market segmentation has become an important alternative for small and
medium ﬁrms, which cannot compete against the largest ﬁrms on the basis of
price. However, these individual strategies required a strong effort of collective
action to support them. For example, organic products have become an important,
though challenging alternative, mainly based on small producers’ consortia.
Geographical denominations such as Cafe ´ do Cerrado, and high quality pre-
prepared food have represented important niches for survival.
Substantial cooperative action has been necessary to implement those strategies
and to lobby for the needed legislation. Organic products and origin denomination
still lack adequate legislation and enforcement. The Association of Cafe ´d o
Cerrado (CACCER) has been important in obtaining those changes and also in
developing the culture and expertise among coffee growers to supply high quality
and special coffees (Farina, 1994a). By the same token, ABIC—the coffee
roasters association—has developed collective strategies to regain consumer
conﬁdence in Brazilian coffee and also to foster the consumption of specialty
coffees (Farina and Saes, 1998).
Although collective action has been important in coping with new competition,
Brazilian farmer and processing cooperatives have faced a loss of reputation
among rural and industrial producers as well. Most new collective strategies are
based on associations and consortia. Successful strategies based on market
segmentation and product differentiation depend on new governance structures
that guarantee quality, regularity, and competitive prices. In the Mercosur context,
the identiﬁcation of suppliers is not constrained by national frontiers and there has
been real competition among the production systems of the four countries.
Collective action has also been used in the marketing segments. On the one
hand, the most dynamic wholesalers have implemented new strategies to keep
their best clients, such as the creation of associations to supply small and medium
supermarkets. Without formal contracts, the retailer is guaranteed a regular supply
at competitive prices and the wholesaler keeps its market-share. This strategy
reduces waste and beneﬁts both retailer and wholesaler (Farina and Machado,
1999).
On the other hand, small and medium supermarkets have acted cooperatively
through their union (SINCOVAGA) to make viable the adoption of electronic
supply chain management such as EDI and ECR (a project technically supported
by the University of Sao Paulo). They also have tried to adopt a “neighborhood
store strategy,” avoiding direct competition with the largest supermarket chains.
To cope with the market power of larger retailing chains, the food industry has
given some support to small and medium retailers’ strategies, in collaboration
with the SINCOVAGA project.
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PERSPECTIVES
The increasing competitive pressure in the Brazilian economy has led the food
and agribusiness system to adopt quality management procedures to reduce costs
of logistics, production, and distribution. A second target is consumer recognition
and willingness to pay premium prices. As the Brazilian government has lost
reputation in these areas, the private sector has adopted mechanisms such as
private quality certiﬁcation and traceability.
Despite the difﬁculties discussed above for the integration of Mercosur, many
investment opportunities have been appearing for agribusiness, especially related
to such products for which there are complementary characteristics. The capital
goods and food industries have been investing in plants across the country-
members or forming joint ventures. These cross-operations allow for scale and
scope economies, and for tracking consumer preferences and supplier trustwor-
thiness. However, the investment risks are still high because of recurrent crises
within the block caused mainly by macroeconomic instability. Joint ventures,
strategic alliances, and direct investments across member-countries create a
favorable environment for institutional and economic harmonization because of
the main players’ interests.
The new competition patterns that came with growing regional integration and
globalization have required adaptation by the Brazilian ﬁrms. Most of the leading
Brazilian companies were sold. The remaining companies not only have to adjust
costs but also must adopt quality and cost, not only for their own products but also
for their suppliers’ products and management practices. Small and medium ﬁrms
have found successful strategies in niches and speciﬁc market segments. Many of
these strategies have been supported by collective action by associations,
consortia, and to a lesser extent by traditional cooperatives.
NOTES
1. Brazil’s population is 78% of Mercosur’s population, its GDP is 62% of the region’s GDP
although it has only half the per capital GDP of Argentina and the worst income distribution
(Table 1); Brazil’s exports are 62% and its imports 60% of the Mercosur totals, and 43% of
intrablock exports and 46% of intrablock imports are Brazilian.
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